

instructed her to "take good care" of Shelby, and then, during a funding round in 1986, his name came up and "it was made clear that he was to be taken care of." Tr. 3247, 3249.

By the same token, it was for the jury to decide the credibility of defendant's alternative defense -- which she raised as to all these projects -- that she was unaware that Mitchell (and later Brennan) were being paid to act as consultants on these projects and that Mitchell and Brennan lied to her regarding Mitchell's role. See Tr. 2989-90, 3003. In this regard, the jury was entitled to consider defendant's testimony that she was shocked upon learning of the payments to Mitchell when she received the HUD-IG Report, and that she expressed her anger to HUD IG agent Al Cain, Tr. 2617; and the jury was further entitled to consider Agent Cain's testimony on rebuttal that to his recollection this conversation never occurred.²⁵ Tr. 3199. Likewise, the jury was entitled to weigh defendant's testimony that her best recollection was that she had met Nunn only after leaving HUD against her admission on cross-examination that she had told a reporter in 1989 that she had known Nunn since she was a little girl. Tr. 3029.²⁶

²⁵ In addition, it was well within the jury's province to conclude that defendant could not plausibly have believed that Mitchell was performing pro bono services for Martinez and Nunn, particularly in light of defendant's own testimony regarding Mitchell's business difficulties and need for money.

²⁶ Similarly, on cross-examination, defendant sought to distance herself from Mitchell by claiming that she did not know him well until leaving HUD. Given the extensive evidence to the contrary -- including the HUD letters to him addressed to "Dad" or "Daddy" -- the jury was entitled to disbelieve this testimony, and to infer from it that defendant was seeking to hide her conspiratorial dealings. See Ziegler, 994 F.2d at 849, and